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 Between 2001 and 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration determined 40.2 
percent of fatal general aviation accidents in the United States, or 1,259 accidents, were 
caused by inflight loss of control.  General aviation accidents continue to be responsible 
for more than 440 fatalities each year in the United States, and approximately 40 percent 
of these are caused by loss of control, mainly stalls.  This sequential mixed methods 
study tested the theory that the number of stalls in the traffic pattern in light general 
aviation aircraft can be reduced when aircraft are equipped with supplemental angle of 
attack instrumentation designed to provide the pilot continuous situational awareness 
regarding remaining lift available for the current aircraft configuration and flight 
conditions.  Quantitative research questions first addressed the relationship between 
stabilized approaches and installation of supplemental AOA systems through multiple 
regressions.  Safety surveys of flight instructors and students were then used to probe 
significant findings regarding AOA system contributions to flying stabilized approaches.  
These follow up surveys were designed to better understand the quantitative results as 
well as collect information useful to developing future training.  Over the course of 1,616 
analyzed approaches flown between October 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014, the 
addition of supplemental angle of attack systems alone did not significantly increase the 
likelihood of subject pilots flying a stabilized approach.  The overall regression models 
for airspeed and altitude elements of stabilized approaches were significant, but no 
significant effect of supplemental AOA systems was observed.  Likewise, checking each
x 
 
individual AOA system for influence on approach performance against the control group 
of unmodified aircraft yielded no significant effects.  Technical limitations of flight data 
collection equipment and lack of formal training for subject pilots were identified as 
possible masks of AOA system effects.  Recommendations for formal training and future 














 Between 2001 and 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) determined 
40.2 percent of fatal general aviation accidents in the United States, or 1,259 accidents, 
were caused by inflight loss of control (FAA GAJSC, 2012).  Of all these fatal accidents, 
the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association’s (AOPA) Air Safety Institute claims stalls 
and spins during the base to final turn accounted for seven percent while other loss of 
control while maneuvering made up another 13 percent (Hirschman, 2011).  General 
aviation accidents continue to be responsible for more than 440 fatalities each year in the 
United States, and approximately 40 percent of these are caused by loss of control, 
mainly stalls (FAA InFO, 2014).   
An aircraft’s angle of attack, or AOA, is defined as the angle between the wing’s 
chord line and the relative wind (Figure 1).  The chord is a line drawn between the wing’s 
leading edge and its trailing edge.  The relative wind refers to the direction at which a 
vehicle in flight meets the oncoming airstream.  While many texts display the relative 
wind horizontally, and perhaps contribute to common confusion between pitch angle (the 
angle between the aircraft’s longitudinal axis and the Earth’s surface) and AOA, the 
relative wind is not necessarily parallel to the Earth’s surface, particularly when the 
aircraft is not in level flight.  Relative wind is also known as freestream velocity, or the 
velocity of the airflow far enough in front of the aircraft that it is not affected by the 
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aircraft passing through it (Scott, 2004).  A complete list of aviation terms used in this 
study is included at Appendix A.     
 
  
                  Level Flight                                                     Climb 
 
Descent 
Figure 1. AOA in level flight, climb, and descent (Scott, 2004) 
The lift produced by the wing increases as AOA increases until airflow traveling 
over the wing’s upper surface begins to separate.  Once this separation occurs, lift is 
drastically reduced.  Critical AOA (Figure 2) is that AOA at which the wing’s maximum 
lift is achieved, beyond which there is a significant loss of lift and increase in drag, where 
the wing “stalls” (FAA, 2008 and McCormick, 1979).  
   Regardless of airspeed, the wing always stalls at the same AOA independent of 
aircraft attitude.  For airfoils used in light general aviation aircraft wings (often NACA 
2412 airfoils), the critical AOA is typically approximately 15 degrees.  The actual stalling 
airspeed varies, and depends on such factors as weight, loading, acceleration, and bank 
angle.  AOA systems make it simpler for pilots to maintain situational awareness during 
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critical or high-workload phases of flight.  AOPA’s manager of regulatory affairs, David 
Oord, claims AOA systems will help general aviation pilots maintain control “regardless 
of weight, airspeed, bank angle, density altitude, configuration, or center of gravity” 
(Namowitz, 2014, p. 1). 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between lift and angle of attack 
Nevertheless, few light general aviation airplanes are equipped with real time 
AOA instrumentation.  Unless they have flown more advanced aircraft, general aviation 
pilots’ knowledge of AOA concepts remains limited to what was learned in ground 
school, and may not easily translate to everyday flying.  Light general aviation aircraft 
pilots rely on indicated airspeed and/or control “feel” and are left to guess exactly when 
the airplane will stall based on a known stall speed for an unaccelerated straight flight 
condition, inflight experience gained while learning stall recoveries, and academic 
discussions of aerodynamic theory they might have had during ground training.  
Installing instrumentation to continuously display AOA regardless of weight, air density, 
aircraft attitude, turbulence, ground effect, or flap/landing gear configuration increases 
the pilot’s awareness of lift available prior to stall (Hirschman, 2011).  Theoretically, 
supplemental AOA instrumentation should reduce the number of loss of control accidents 
by more clearly alerting the pilot prior to stalling the aircraft. 
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 In response to concern about overall general aviation safety, the FAA created its 
General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) during the mid-1990s to parallel the 
existing Commercial Aviation Safety Team.  After becoming inactive for several years, it 
was reestablished in 2011.  FAA and industry representatives agreed to pursue a one 
percent annual reduction in the general aviation fatal accident rate based on the period 
2006-2008, arriving at a rate no greater than one fatal accident per 100,000 flying hours 
by 2018.  The committee’s Loss of Control Work Group studied accident subsets of 
experimental amateur-built airplanes, certified piston engine airplanes, and turbine engine 
powered airplanes in an attempt to identify focus areas for new safety initiatives.  The 
group examined 279 approach and landing accidents recorded between 2001 and 2010, 
and randomly selected 60 representing each subset.  They then examined the first 30 well 
documented accidents from each list in detail.  Subject matter experts provided the group 
briefings about AOA indicators, electronic recovery control systems, upset recovery 
training, and prescription and over-the-counter drugs used by pilots.  The Loss of Control 
Work Group approved 23 individual safety enhancement projects in 2012.  The top two 
priority projects focus on AOA systems for new and current production aircraft, and for 
the existing general aviation fleet (FAA GAJSC, 2012).  Kevin Clover, National FAA 
Safety Team operations lead, explained the overall goal of the work group’s suggested 
enhancements: “Outcomes for these strategies will likely evolve into aviation technology 
changes and/or enhancements.  Other strategies will focus on enhanced training and 
educational outreach and will involve a greater working relationship with the FAA Safety 
Team” (Hoffmann, 2012, p. 29).  Current FAA training in AOA awareness is found in 
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Advisory Circular AC120-109, “Stall and Stick Pusher Training,” but expanded training 
literature for general aviation applications will be needed (Namowitz, 2012). 
 Although there has been limited interest in AOA instrumentation for general 
aviation aircraft for the last 30 years, little research has been done to investigate any 
measurable safety enhancement realized by its use.  Fred Scott, a pilot who lost friends in 
a stall/spin accident, and Tom Rosen, American Bonanza Society director, have funded 
initial testing of AOA instrumentation manufactured by Alpha Systems, a Minnesota firm 
which began developing and selling AOA equipment for general aviation in the 1980s 
(Hirschman, 2011).  Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University recently installed AOA 
indicators on its entire fleet of 61 Cessna training aircraft at its Daytona Beach and 
Prescott campuses.  In an unpublished demonstration, the university conducted 30 trial 
flights prior to installation to qualitatively determine which AOA display would be most 
effective and gather flight instructor feedback on which maneuvers would be most 
improved for student pilots.  Initial findings indicated student knowledge of aircraft 
performance improved, particularly at slower airspeeds.  Future research will be aimed at 
identifying best practices and learning methodologies for integrating AOA technology 
into flight education (Van Buren, 2013). 
 Purdue University is currently the lead organization for a general aviation AOA 
equipment research project funded by the FAA’s Partnership to Enhance General 
Aviation Safety, Accessibility and Sustainability (PEGASAS).  With assistance from 
researchers at Ohio State University and Florida Institute of Technology, this project 
aims to develop AOA educational materials for general aviation as well as conduct a 
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cost/benefit/risk analysis of various supplemental AOA systems for general aviation 
aircraft.  Results of this study are expected in 2015 (PEGASAS, 2014).  
 A limitation inhibiting more detailed quantitative research is the lack of flight data 
monitoring systems on most general aviation aircraft.  Even where flight data recording 
was and is available, previous and current work has been limited to “snapshot data” of 
specific points in time.  Investigators were forced to build a picture of dynamic flight 
conditions by interpreting static data.  As part of the University of North Dakota’s Flight 
Data Monitoring program, snapshot data of all training flights has been collected on 
Garmin G1000 secure digital (SD) cards and more recently by Appareo flight data 
recorders.  To overcome previous static data limitations, the university recently 
developed a tool designed to analyze dynamically produced data all along an airplane’s 
approach path and then used it for an initial investigation of turns from base to final 
preceding the approach, since this flight regime represents a worst “low and slow” case, 
where insufficient altitude might be available to recover from an inadvertent stall.  This 
initial study examined approaches before and after AOA system installation on the same 
aircraft.  Data analyzed represented 11,324 turns to final at eight different airports and on 
20 different runways.  Subjects flying the aircraft were unaware their performance was 
being measured, no training in use of the AOA instrumentation was provided, and no 
pilot surveys were administered as part of the resultant analysis.  During the turn to final, 
AOA-equipped aircraft lowered the nose more and experienced more aggressive G 
loading than non-AOA-equipped aircraft.  Both of these findings imply AOA equipment 
might be providing enhanced pilot situational awareness of the wing’s full performance 
envelope—lowering the nose to reduce AOA during flight near the critical AOA, but 
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flying more aggressively when excess lift performance is available.  Some conflicting 
results appeared based on seasonal differences, specifically in varying combinations of 
outside air temperature and pressure altitude, so initial results were considered 
encouraging, but not conclusive (Higgins, 2014). 
Despite having only a small collection of quantifiable data illustrating the safety 
enhancement provided by AOA instrumentation in general aviation aircraft, the Loss of 
Control Work Group issued recommendations for use based on a long period of military 
experience with AOA systems and the intuitive benefits provided by increased situational 
awareness.  “The GA community should embrace to the fullest extent the stall margin 
awareness benefits of these systems.  To help the GA community understand the safety 
benefits of AOA systems, a public education campaign should be developed…” 
(Namowitz, 2013, p. 1).  The GAJSC does seek to make its work data driven to ensure 
analytical credibility that would allow the FAA and industry to plan for implementation 
(FAA GAJSC, 2012).  The present study expands on initial University of North Dakota 
research to enhance the quality and quantity of data available to the FAA as well as 
provide a basis for the public education campaign called for by Namowitz. 
Background--Genesis in Military Aviation 
 High performance military aircraft have incorporated AOA systems into their 
avionics for many years.  Rob Hickman, founder of Advanced Flight Systems, a 
manufacturer of supplemental AOA systems, uses this experience as a main sales point 
for his products by explaining that AOA has long been the main measure used by U.S. 
Navy aircraft approaching carriers (Hirschman, 2011). 
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 An aircraft and AOA system representative of military high performance aircraft 
in general is the Northrop T-38 Talon, a two-seat, twin-engine supersonic jet trainer 
flown by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy Test Pilot School, and NASA. 
 The T-38 AOA system includes a heated vane transmitter on the right forward 
fuselage (Figure 3), a CPU-115/A computer, and in each cockpit, an AOA indicator,  
 
Figure 3. Northrop T-38 Talon 
indexer, and indexer lights dimmer control (Figure 4).  The AOA system compensates for 
flap and landing gear configurations, and presents the following displays in each cockpit: 
optimum AOA for final approach, AOA when buffet and stall will occur, and 
approximate AOA for maximum range and maximum endurance (USAF, 1978). 
 An AOA dial (Figure 4) on the upper left of each instrument panel is calibrated in 
units of 0.1 counterclockwise from 0 to 1.1.  Each unit represents approximately 10 
percent of aircraft lift.  The dial is marked with maximum range (.18), maximum 
endurance (.3), optimum final approach (.6), buffet warning (.9-1.0), and stall warning 
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AOA (1.0-1.1).  AOA indexer lights (Figure 4) mounted on each glare shield are 
operative in the landing configuration with flaps up or down, or when landing gear is up 
and flaps are extended 5 percent or more.  The high speed indexer is inoperative when 
landing gear and flaps are up to eliminate continuous illumination during cruise flight.  
All three symbols illuminate to indicate system failure (USAF, 1978). 
 
Figure 4. T-38 Flight Manual--AOA System and Displays (USAF, 1978, p. 4-10) 
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Bringing Supplemental Add-On AOA Systems to General Aviation 
In its Safety Enhancement 1, the Loss of Control Work Group’s Statement of 
Work recommends,  
To reduce the risk of inadvertent stall/departure resulting in LOC [loss of control] 
accidents, the GA community should install and use AOA based systems for 
better awareness of stall margin…GA aircraft manufacturers should work to 
develop cost effective AOA installations for new and existing designs currently in 
production.  Owners and operators of GA aircraft should be encouraged to have 
AOA systems installed in their aircraft (FAA GAJSC, 2012, p. 16) 
 
 In response to this recommendation, the FAA sought to simplify the approval 
process for post-production equipment to be installed on previously certified aircraft.  
FAA Memorandum AIR100-14-110-PM01 established design requirements for 
supplemental AOA systems.  An AOA system must be a stand-alone unit and must not 
interface with a currently certificated system, with the exception of an electrical power 
supply.  AOA instruments must contain markings or placards stating “Not for use as a 
primary instrument for flight.”  Finally, supplemental AOA systems may not be installed 
on commuter or transport category airplanes (Hempe & Seipel, 2014). 
 Traditional systems sense AOA through external heated vanes mounted on the 
side of the fuselage.  While these systems are precise, they are also expensive, and may 
be cost prohibitive for light general aviation aircraft use.  Non-Technical Standard Order 
systems for general aviation aircraft as described in the FAA memorandum are usually 
sold as kits costing $600 to $1500.  Rather than a vane, these systems employ other 
means of detecting angle of attack.  A fixed, under-wing mast completely separate from 
the aircraft’s pitot/static system with ports measuring differential air pressure may be 
used.  Static ports installed on the top and bottom of the wing surface measure differential 
air pressure without an external probe.  Other systems use a pitot tube and static port 
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combination to measure differential air pressure.  Finally, the wing leading edge stall 
warning tab can be replaced by a heated lift transducer designed to transmit AOA data to 
a primary flight display and/or AOA instrument.  Because they are separate from existing 
aircraft systems, any of the AOA systems designed for supplemental general aviation use 
can provide backup information to safely recover the aircraft in the event of a blocked 
pitot tube or failed airspeed indicator (Hirschman, 2011).  
Existing AOA Systems for General Aviation 
Companies currently manufacturing AOA indicators for general aviation include 
Advanced Flight Systems, Alpha Systems, BendixKing, Dynon, Garmin, InAir 
Instruments, and Safe Flight Instrument Corporation. Descriptions of each of these AOA 
systems follow. 
Advanced Flight Systems Pro III and Sport 
Advanced Flight Systems, Inc., a Dynon Avionics company, manufactures two different 
standalone systems, the AOA Pro III and AOA Sport (Figure 5).  Both sense dynamic 
pressures with two pressure ports in the installed probe mounted under the wing. 
       
 
Figure 5. left to right: Advanced Flight Systems AOA probe, Pro III, and Sport 
(Advanced Flight Systems, 2014) 
 
The AOA Pro III is a liquid crystal display with 26 colored segments. It includes a voice 
warning system announcing high AOA and landing gear position errors.  AOA is 
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displayed in both digital and analog formats (Advanced Flight Systems AOA Pro III, 
2014).  The AOA Pro III has a retail price of $1,495.  The AOA Sport is designed for 
tight instrument panels and can be installed between instruments or on the glare shield.  It 
has a retail price of $890 (Advanced Flight Systems Products, 2014).           
Alpha Systems 
 The Alpha Systems AOA system was designed to meet the objective of FAA 
Advisory Circular AC23.1309-1C to improve the safety of the general aviation airplane 
fleet as a standalone device increasing pilot situational awareness when operating at high 
angles of attack.  An AOA probe is mounted under the wing, replacing an existing 
inspection cover.  The probe faces forward at approximately a 50 degree downward angle 
from the horizontal.  Two sensor ports measure the differential pressure.  A control 
module interprets the AOA probe data and sends it to one of a variety of displays 
installed in the cockpit (Alpha Systems, 2014). 
 Griffin, Falcon, Eagle 
 Griffin, Falcon, and Eagle (Figure 6) are “top of the glare shield” displays 
designed to provide accurate real time AOA indications in the pilot’s line of sight in a 
             
Figure 6. left to right: Alpha Systems Griffin, Falcon, Eagle (Alpha Systems, 2014) 
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manner similar to military systems.  Each kit weighs less than three pounds and has a 
retail price of $1,995. 
 Valkyrie Heads Up Display Adapter  
 The Valkyrie Heads Up Display (HUD) adapter takes the Griffin, Eagle, or 
Falcon display and projects it as a HUD display (Figure 7).  The retail price is $500. 
 
Figure 7. Alpha Systems Valkyrie HUD (Alpha Systems, 2014) 
 Condor, Hawk, Dragon, Merlin 
 Condor, Hawk, Dragon, and Merlin (Figure 8) provide a “lift reserve” display in 
circular and rectangular formats.  Condor and Hawk are flush mounted instrument panel  
       
 





displays, while Dragon is a dash mount version of the Hawk.  Merlin is a light bar display 
suitable for amounting above or below the glare shield.  Each kit weighs less than three 
pounds and has a retail price of $1,995. 
Bendix King KLR 10 
 The BendixKing KLR 10 measures differential air pressures at two points on an 
AOA probe mounted to the wing, converts the pressures into an electronic signal in the 
KLR 10 IF module, and transmits an electronic signal to a 2.25 inch LED indicator 
mounted on top of the airplane’s glare shield (Figure 9).  Mutable audio warnings of   
 
Figure 9. BendixKing KLR 10 (BendixKing, 2014) 
“Check AOA;” “Caution, Too Slow;” and “Too Slow! Too Slow!” are added to the visual 
indications as the aircraft approaches critical AOA.  A photo cell in the instrument 
detects ambient light changes and automatically switches from daytime to nighttime 
brightness presets.  Manual control allows the pilot to fine tune instrument brightness.  
The system draws less than 250mA of electrical power, and if an optional probe heater is 
added, requires less than eight amps at 12 or 24VDC to operate.  A calibrated system will 
have +/- three percent accuracy, which is maintained over a sideslip range of +/- 15 
degrees.  The KLR 10 installation kit has a retail price of $1,450 (BendixKing, 2014). 
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Dynon Avionics FlightDEK-D180 
 Dynon Avionics offers AOA/pitot probes to support AOA instrumentation 
integral to various Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS).  Rather than serving as 
an add-on sensor, the AOA/pitot probe is designed to replace the standard pitot tube on 
experimental aircraft and provide inputs to both airspeed indicators and AOA indicators 
included on supported EFIS. The normal pitot pressure port is on the front face of the 
tube, while the second pressure port is on an angled surface below the pitot port (Figure 
10).  Separate air lines run to the avionics, where they are translated into AOA (Dynon 
Avionics, 2014). 
 Three versions of the AOA/Pitot tube are available: standard L-shaped tubes in 
heated and unheated versions, and a boom-mount version (Figure 11).  Retail prices 
range from $200 to $450 (Dynon Avionics, 2014). 
 






Figure 11. Dynon Avionics AOA/Pitot tubes (Dynon Avionics, 2014) 
Garmin GI 260 
 The Garmin GI 260 calculates AOA using pitot, AOA, and static air pressure 
inputs.  The system consists of the GI 260 indicator, GAP 26 probe, and the GSU 25 air 
data computer (Figure 12).  The probe sends pitot and AOA air pressures to the GSU 25.  
The air data computer then combines this data with an independent static source to 
calculate AOA and sends it to the indicator.   
 
Figure 12. Garmin AOA system components (Garmin, 2014) 
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The GI 260 indicator displays AOA information via ten color-coded LED annunciators 
(Figure 13).  When connected to an audio system, it generates aural alerts as the aircraft 
approaches critical AOA (Garmin, 2014). 
 
Figure 13. Garmin GI 260 display (Garmin, 2014) 
 The system automatically arms as the aircraft accelerates past 50 knots.  Visual 
displays begin immediately after arming and aural warnings become active 15 seconds 
after arming to avoid premature alerts during the takeoff roll.  The Garmin AOA system 
retail price is $1,649 (Garmin, 2014). 
InAir Instruments Lift Reserve Indicator 
 InAir Instruments’ Lift Reserve Indicator (Figure 14) integrates both airspeed and 
AOA into a single continuous readout.  The system includes a rectangular airstream 
probe mounted on the underside of a wing and a display gauge.  Two air pressure ports 
on the probe are piped to the instrument display, which calculates lift reserve from the 
differential pressure.  The LRI is complementary to the airplane’s airspeed indicator and 
can serve as a backup in the event of a primary system failure.  Retail price for a system 





Figure 14. InAir Instruments Lift Reserve Indicator (InAir Instruments, 2014) 
Safe Flight SCx 
 In July 2014, Safe Flight Instrument Corporation announced a new leading edge 
AOA system designed for the experimental, homebuilt, and kit plane market called the 
SCx (Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15. Safe Flight SCx Lift Transducer and Indexer Computer (Safe Flight, News 
Release, 2014) 
 
The SCx was to be followed by the SCc system for FAA certificated aircraft in late 2014.  
Like other AOA systems, the SCx provides improved high AOA situational awareness 
through a combined visual display and audio output.  Unique to the SCx however, is the 
lift transducer mounted at the leading edge of the wing to measure the leading edge 
stagnation point and air flow field (Safe Flight news release, 2014).  The stagnation point 
refers to the area where airflow divides to flow over the top and bottom wing surfaces.  
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Local air flow at this point has maximum pressure and zero airspeed, and its location is 
uniquely related to the wing’s angle of attack.  As distance from the stagnation point 
increases, so does local airspeed.  The lift transducer measures the force of local airspeed 
with respect to the stagnation point (Safe Flight, 2013). 
By correlating lift with airflow characteristics at the stagnation point on the wing, 
the SCx Lift Transducer measures precise changes in AOA and provides the 
output interpreted and displayed by the SCx Indexer Computer…By placing the 
sensing element where the action is—at the leading edge, you have the most 
accurate and dependable measurement of AOA (Safe Flight SCx, 2014, p. 1). 
 
Best speeds for maximum range, maximum endurance, short field landing speed, etc. are 
actually best angles of attack.  Aircraft speeds listed in the Pilot’s Operating Handbook 
are always calculated for the airplane’s maximum gross weight, and are merely the 
corresponding airspeed for a specific angle of attack (Safe Flight, 2013).  Flying at lesser 
weights without supplemental AOA instrumentation leaves the pilot with no way to 
measure these best speeds with precision.       
Purpose  
 The intent of this two-phase, sequential mixed methods study is to test the theory 
that the number of stalls in the traffic pattern in light general aviation aircraft can be 
reduced when aircraft are equipped with supplemental angle of attack instrumentation 
designed to provide the pilot continuous situational awareness regarding remaining lift 
available for the current aircraft configuration and flight conditions.  In the first phase, 
quantitative research questions addressed the relationship between stabilized approaches 
and installation of supplemental AOA systems.  Independent variables include AOA 
system installed, presence of vertical guidance system, time of day (day or night), outside 
air temperature, presence of an air traffic control tower, and length and width of runway.  
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Three dependent variables measure aspects of approach stability—airspeed differential 
from optimum, height differential from optimum, and cross track error from extended 
runway centerline.  Information from this first phase was explored further in a second 
qualitative phase.  Safety surveys of flight instructors and students were used to probe 
significant findings regarding AOA system contributions to flying stabilized approaches.  
These follow up surveys were designed to better understand the quantitative results as 
well as collect information useful to developing future training. 
Research Questions 
1. Are general aviation pilots more likely to fly a stabilized approach in aircraft 
equipped with supplemental AOA systems than in aircraft not so equipped? 
a. Does the presence of vertical guidance systems (visual such as VASI or 
PAPI lighting or electronic such as ILS) affect stabilized approach rates? 
b. Does time of day (day or night) affect stabilized approach rates? 
c. Does outside air temperature affect stabilized approach rates? 
d. Does the presence of an air traffic control tower affect stabilized approach 
rates? 
e. Do runway characteristics (length and width) affect stabilized approach 
rates? 
f. Does the type of AOA system installed on the aircraft affect stabilized 
approach rates? 
2. Are general aviation pilots who fly AOA-equipped aircraft more likely to execute 




3. How do pilots not previously trained with AOA instrumentation react to the 















 As part of its flight data monitoring program, the University of North Dakota 
records inflight data from Cessna 172 Garmin 1000 avionics on to Secure Digital (SD) 
cards.  More recently, Appareo flight data recorders have also been introduced.  These 
systems allow for collection of many inflight variables useful to providing safety analysis 
for the university’s flight training program.  An integral part of any aviation safety 
program is avoiding using safety analysis as an enforcement tool against pilots who may 
have violated FAA regulations or local training rules since it would discourage 
acceptance of flight data monitoring systems and full disclosure of safety information 
helpful to analysis and future safety lessons learned.  In order to protect the integrity of 
the safety analysis system, the University of North Dakota designed its flight data 
monitoring data base to protect the identity of involved pilots. 
 For the quantitative phase of this study, subjects were student pilots and 
instructors assigned to fly University of North Dakota Cessna 172s, but specific 
identifying data for each flight describing other characteristics such as flight experience, 
gender, or ethnic group, were not directly available.  Since all subject aircraft flights of 
relevant airframes were examined during the time period of interest, demographic 
characteristics of those enrolled in university flying training programs in general will 
serve as a substitute to describe the general aviation certificated pilots and student pilots 
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whose performance was examined.  Students participating in the flight program are those 
enrolled in the following academic programs: commercial aviation, air traffic control, 
airport management, aviation management, aviation technology management, flight 
education, and Unmanned Aircraft Systems operations.  Table 1 illustrates the gender and 
ethnic group representation of students enrolled in these seven academic programs during 
the fall semester of 2012, the most recent academic year for which published data is 
available (University of North Dakota Institutional Research, 2015). 
During the qualitative phase of this study, safety surveys of the university’s 
students and flight instructors were completely anonymous.  The only demographic data 
provided by these surveys was level of pilot certification, from student pilot through 
flight instructor.  This data is included with survey results in Chapter III. 
Equipment 
 The University of North Dakota has equipped three of its Cessna 172 aircraft, 
each with a different AOA system:  a Bendix King KLR 10 was installed on aircraft 
N529ND on March 18, 2014 (Figure 16); a pre-production Safe Flight SCx was installed 
on aircraft N524ND on April 17, 2014 (Figure 17); and a Garmin GI 260 was installed on 
aircraft N525ND on May 28, 2014 (Figure 18) (Higgins, 2014).  Each of these aircraft is 
equipped with G1000 SD cards or Appareo recorders identical to the rest of the 
university’s aircraft fleet of 63 Cessna 172s. 
 The University of North Dakota’s flight data monitoring program is the secure 
repository for all inflight data.  A proprietary “turn-to-final” analysis tool was used to 
analyze each turn to final in terms of airport and runway, date, outside air temperature, 







Figure 16. Bendix King KLR 10 Installation on N529ND 
 
 
Figure 17. Safe Flight Prototype Installation on N524ND   
 
Figure 18. Garmin GI 260 Installation on N525ND 
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start/stop/maximum/minimum, indicated airspeed-start/stop/maximum/minimum, vertical 
speed indication-start/stop/maximum/minimum, pitch-start/stop/maximum/minimum, 
roll-start/stop/maximum/minimum, engine RPM-start/stop/maximum/minimum, and 
groundspeed.  “Start/stop/maximum/minimum” refers to measurements of the specific 
variable taken from the beginning of the turn to final (start) until the turn is completed 
(stop).  Maximum and minimum refer to the largest and smallest values of the variable 
measured during the turn.  Similarly, a proprietary “dynamic approach” analysis tool 
translated approach data from 200 feet above ground level (AGL) until approximately 
four seconds prior to touchdown, measured at a 1Hz rate, into a dynamic picture of each 
approach.  Four seconds prior to touchdown was chosen as an end point because 
equipment limitations preclude measuring the exact point of touchdown.  Flight data 
monitoring does not include radar altitude (aircraft are not equipped with a radar 
altimeter), weight on wheels determination is not available, and flap position is not 
recorded.  Data points collected include: airport and runway, outside air temperature,  day 
or night light conditions, height above touchdown differential (desired vs. actual), cross 
track error, date, time, time spent on final, indicated airspeed differential (desired vs. 
actual), and wind component. 
Procedure 
 In the quantitative phase of this study, data collected and analyzed was extracted 
from the University of North Dakota’s flight data monitoring program database. All data 
was recorded in a naturalistic flight training environment with all subjects unaware of 
what performance parameters were measured.  Once quantitative data collection was 
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complete, a qualitative safety survey was administered to expand on initial findings and 
focus on future training requirements.   
This study analyzes aircraft traffic patterns, flown from base leg to final approach 
through completion of the approach (full stop landing, touch and go landing, or low 
approach) between October 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014 (n = 1,644) for the three 
University of North Dakota Cessna 172 aircraft modified with supplemental AOA 
instrumentation.  Knowing the AOA equipment installation date for each aircraft and 
choosing an analysis period beginning in advance of modification allowed data to be 
compared for unmodified and modified aircraft where the only configuration change was 
installation of supplemental AOA instrumentation.  Data for the entire subject population 
is available, so sampling procedures designed to select a subset of the population were 
not required. 
While many similar operational definitions are in use, no standardized definition 
of stabilized approach exists.  For purposes of this study, stabilized approach was 
determined by an analyzed approach meeting the following parameters:  airspeed 56-71 
KIAS (+10/-5 knots of optimum approach speed), altitude +/-33 feet of desired glide 
slope, and cross track error of less than +/-100 feet.  The airspeed parameter reflects the 
FAA’s acceptable final approach standard for private pilots (FAA, 2011).  The altitude 
parameter is equivalent to reaching full scale deflection of the ILS glide slope display at 
200 AGL or high (all white lights)/low (all red lights) on visual approach lighting systems 
(PAPI or VASI).  The cross track error parameter is equivalent to full-scale deflection of 
the course display for a commonly installed localizer signal at approximately 3,800 feet 
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from the ILS glide slope point of intercept with the runway (where the aircraft is at 
approximately 200 AGL on a three-degree glide slope). 
For training, the University of North Dakota uses a slightly more strict definition.  
By 200 AGL, all checklists must be complete, the aircraft must be on course centerline 
and glideslope, configured for landing, and at an airspeed of 61 KIAS -0/+5 with power 
set.  An altitude of 200 AGL represents approximately 45 seconds prior to aircraft 
touchdown.  This “time to go” to landing is similar to stabilized approach checkpoints 
used by larger professional operators at higher altitudes and airspeeds where an approach 
must be stable in order to continue to a landing (Kugler, 2014).  Figure 19 displays 
typical stabilized approach checkpoints used by the University of North Dakota flying 
training program, some Part 135 operators, some Part 121 operators, and some U.S. Air 
Force commands. 
The independent variable AOA status was determined by the aircraft tail number 
and date of the flight.  The airport and runway to which an approach was flown was 
determined by GPS position.  From this information, independent variables vertical 
guidance, air traffic control present, runway length, and runway width were determined.  
Time and date stamp allowed the independent variable day or night to be determined.  
Measured outside air temperature was selected to study previously observed seasonal 
effects. 
Design 
 This study is a two-phase, sequential mixed methods design.  Quantitative 
measures of performance parameters in a naturalistic setting were collected and analyzed 
to address the first two research questions about AOA instrumentation performance.  
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These questions were addressed in terms of supplemental AOA systems generally, and 
also specifically in terms of the three systems installed on University of North Dakota 
aircraft.  A qualitative safety survey collected data from pilots in the University of North  
 
 
Figure 19. Approach speed vs. time to touchdown for typical stabilized approach 
checkpoints (Kugler, 2014) 
 
Dakota flight training program to examine the second and third research questions as well 
as provide additional perspective to conclusions reached from quantitative analysis. 
Statistical Analysis 
 With three continuous dependent variables describing stabilized approaches 
considered one parameter at a time (speed differential, height differential, and cross track 
error), and seven categorical or continuous independent variables, multiple regression is 
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the appropriate statistical test.  Main effects were examined for the independent variables 
for all aircraft in the population.  Specific AOA systems were also examined separately to 












Flight Data Monitoring Analysis 
 The primary flight data analysis was conducted using simultaneous multiple 
regressions.  This type of regression analysis tests the significance of each independent 
variable after all other predictors are included in the model.  Independent variables 
included AOA modification status, presence of vertical guidance, day or night lighting 
conditions, outside air temperature, presence of air traffic control, runway length and 
runway width.  Dependent variables represent elements of stabilized approach: speed 
differential, height differential, and cross track error.  Means, standard deviations, and 
ranges for each of the continuous independent variables and dependent variables are 
listed in Table 2.  Frequencies for each of the categorical independent variables are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 2.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges. 
    Mean   Standard Deviation   Range 






-51.19 - 25.31 
  
     
  






-203.04 - 148.19 
  
     
  






-504.35 - 472.57 
  
     
  






-28.07 - 44.12 
  
     
  






3,199.00 - 7,351.00 
  
     
  
Runway Width (ft.)   90.03   30.65   60.00 - 150.00 
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Table 3.  Frequencies. 







AOA Status 814   285   183   362 
  no  
 
yes 
Vertical Guidance present 59   1,585 
  night 
 
day 
Day or Night 209   1,435 
  no 
 
yes 
ATC present 242   1,402 
 
Data was gathered for 1,644 approaches flown to 14 different runways at four 
different airports (Grand Forks International Airport, Grand Forks, ND; Crookston 
Municipal Kirkwood Field, Crookston, MN; Hutson Field, Grafton, ND; and Warren 
Municipal Airport, Warren, MN).  Diagrams of each airport, similar to those found in the 
FAA’s Airport/Facility Directory, are available in Appendix C. 
Outliers 
 Simple boxplots were constructed for each continuous variable to identify outliers 
in the data. A boxplot defines outliers by these criteria: values that are 1.5 times the 
interquartile range greater than the 75th percentile or 1.5 times the interquartile range less 
than the 25th percentile for each variable.  Among the dependent variables, 16 outliers 
were identified for speed differential (Figure 20), 22 outliers were identified for height 
differential (Figure 21), and 36 outliers were identified for cross track error (Figure 22).  
Each of the outlier cases among the dependent variables was examined in more detail 
using additional flight data collected for that approach.  Of these outliers, 28 appeared to 
be possible go-arounds in progress (see data measurement limitations in Chapter IV), and 
were eliminated from the data set because the approach appears to have been terminated.  
Some of the possible go-arounds were grouped by date in such a way that they may 
represent instrument training in progress where intentional low or missed approaches are 
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common as part of the training curriculum.  Eight other outliers remained unexplained by 
comparison with other data for the same approach.  In these cases, scores were changed 
to the mean plus two standard deviations in the direction of the discrepancy, where they 
yielded logical values for the applicable variable (Field, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 20. Speed Differential Outliers 
 
Among the independent variables, no outliers were identified for outside air 
temperature.  For runway length (Figure 23), 12 outliers were identified, and for runway 
width (Figure 24), 15 outliers were identified, but all cases represented actual runways 
included in the data and thus, remain included for analysis.  Their actual values just 
happened to be extreme within this data set. 
Adjusted means, standard deviations, and ranges for each of the continuous 
independent variables and dependent variables, after accounting for outliers, are listed in 
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Table 4.  Adjusted frequencies for each of the categorical independent variables are 
presented in Table 5. 
 
 



















Table 4.  Adjusted Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges. 
    Mean   
Standard 








-4.81 - 23.98 
  
     
  






-79.00 - 129.50 
  
     
  






-185.75 - 266.77 
  
     
  






-28.07 - 44.12 
  
     
  









     
  
Runway Width (ft.)   90.24   30.81   60.00 - 150.00 
 
 










AOA Status 798   279   181   358 
  no  
 
yes 
   
  
Vertical Guidance 
present 52   1,564         
  night 
 
day 
   
  
Day or Night 203   1,413         
  no 
 
yes 
   
  
ATC present 231   1,385         
 
Correlation and collinearity 
In multiple regression analysis, the independent variables should approach 
independence (Field, 2009).  Bivariate correlations between the independent variables 
and the dependent variables are presented in Table 6.  These correlations suggest an 
acceptable level of collinearity, except for the strong correlation between runway length 
and runway width.  To avoid errors in the multiple regression analysis, runway width was 
eliminated from the regression analysis. 
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Table 6.  Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Speed Diff. -- 
        
  
  
         
  
2. Height Diff. .147** -- 
       
  
  
         
  
3. Cross Track Error .034 .038 -- 
      
  
  
         
  
4. AOA Status .002 .048 -.001 -- 
     
  
  
         
  
5. Vertical Guidance -.026 -.270** -.044 -.037 -- 
    
  
  
         
  
6. Day or Night .117** .019 
-
.050* -.005 -.048 -- 
   
  
  
         
  






         
  








         
  




.020 .185** --   
  
         
  




.024 .206** .987** -- 
                      
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Normality 
 The continuous variables speed differential, height differential, cross track error, 
temperature, and runway length were tested for normality using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test after adjustments were made to the data set to account for outliers. 
The test statistic for the K-S test is signified by D and the degrees of freedom are placed 
in parentheses after the D.  Variables speed differential, D(1616) = .08, p < .05, height 
differential, D(1616) = .12, p < .05, cross track error, D(1616) = .14, p < .05, temperature, 
D(1616) = .072, p < .05, and runway length, D(1616) = .38, p < .05, were all significantly 
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non-normal.  In large samples however, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be significant 
even when the scores are only slightly different from a normal distribution (Field, 2009).  
To further investigate normality, Q-Q plots of each continuous variable were constructed 
and are presented in Figures 25 through 29. 
 
 






















Figure 29. Q-Q plot of Runway Length 
 
 Examining the Q-Q plots reveals that each of the continuous variables seems to 
deviate only slightly from a normal distribution.  Normal distribution of speed 
differential, height differential, cross track error, temperature, and runway length was 
assumed for further analysis. 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
The six independent variables were entered into a multiple regression analysis by 
the forced entry method, where all independent variables were placed into the regression 
model simultaneously.  This results in each independent variable being tested after all 
other variables have been entered into the model. Separate analyses were conducted for 
each of the dependent variables.  Results are reported in Tables 7 through 9.  The 
significance of each independent variable was tested with degrees of freedom of 1 and 
1615.  The regression coefficient (b) estimates the amount of change in the dependent 
variables associated with one unit change in the independent variable.  This value also 
indicates how much a specific independent variable affects the dependent variable if all 
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other independent variables are held constant.  Beta weight (β) is a standardized slope 
coefficient allowing comparison of each of the independent variables’ predictive strength.  
Beta indicates the number of standard deviations the dependent variable will change for 
one standard deviation change in the independent variable.  The t-test measures whether 
the independent variable is making a significant contribution to the regression model.  
Larger values of t indicate larger contributions of that independent variable to the model.  
The squared semi-partial correlation (part r) represents the proportion of variance in the 
dependent variable accounted for by each of the independent variables after all other 
variables were included in the regression equation. 
For analysis, each independent variable was coded numerically for entry into the 
regression formula.  AOA status was coded as zero for an unmodified airplane and one 
for a modified airplane.  No vertical guidance available for the runway analyzed was 
coded zero and coded one for the presence of glide path guidance, whether guidance was 
via a lighting system or via radio signal from the instrument landing system.  For day or 
night, night was coded as zero and day was coded as one.  Outside air temperature was 
entered as a continuous variable in degrees Celsius.  Presence of air traffic control 
referred to whether an operating control tower was on the airport being analyzed.  No 
ATC was coded as zero and ATC present was coded as one.  Finally, runway length was 
entered as a continuous variable with a value measured in feet.    
The dependent variable speed differential refers to the deviation in knots indicated 
airspeed from the optimum 61 KIAS approach airspeed for the Cessna 172.  A positive 
value denotes an approach at faster than optimum airspeed and a negative value denotes 
an approach slower than optimum airspeed. 
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Table 7. Regression Results for Speed Differential. 
  B β t part r 
    
  
AOA modified .0884 .0117 .3750 .0001 
    
  
Vertical Guidance -.3032 -.0142 -.5163 .0001 
    
  
Day or Night 1.3077 .1147 4.7019* .0131 
    
  
Temperature -.0038 -.0141 -.4528 .0001 
    
  
ATC Present -.8905 -.0825 -3.0079* .0054 
    
  
Runway Length .0005 .1739 6.9684* .0288 
    
  
* significant at the .05 level       
 
 The overall regression model for speed differential was significant, R2 = .05, R2adj 
= .04, F(6,1615) = 12.87, p = .00.  Day or night, presence of air traffic control, and 
runway length significantly contributed to the regression model.  Day approaches resulted 
in higher speed differential.  The presence of air traffic control resulted in lower speed 
differential.  Longer runways resulted in higher speed differential. 
 The dependent variable height differential refers to the deviation in feet from the 
optimum 200 AGL where the approach was analyzed.  A positive value denotes an 
approach higher than optimum altitude and a negative value denotes an approach lower 
than optimum altitude. 
 The overall regression model for height differential was significant, R2 = .11, R2adj 
= .10, F(6,1615) = 31.84, p = .00.  Vertical guidance, temperature, presence of air traffic 
control, and runway length significantly contributed to the regression model.  Presence of 
vertical guidance resulted in a lower height differential.  Higher outside air temperature 
resulted in a higher height differential.  Presence of air traffic control resulted in a lower 
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Table 8. Regression Results for Height 
Differential.   
  B β t part r 
    
  
AOA modified -1.3180 -.0273 -.9044 .0005 
    
  
Vertical Guidance -28.1043 -.2055 -7.7428* .0333 
    
  
Day or Night .5512 .0076 .3206 .0001 
    
  
Temperature .1602 .0942 3.1277* .0054 
    
  
ATC Present -6.5378 -.0948 -3.5720* .0071 
    
  
Runway Length -.0022 -.1314 -5.4415* .0165 
    
  
* significant at the .05 level       
 
height differential.  Longer runways resulted in a lower height differential.  
The dependent variable cross track error refers to the deviation right or left of the 
extended runway centerline measured in feet.  A positive value denotes an approach right 
of centerline and a negative value denotes an approach left of centerline. 
The overall regression model for cross track error was not significant, R2 = .01, 
R2adj = .00, F(6,1615) = 2.03, p = .06.  Day approaches significantly reduced cross track 
error in the regression model.  No variables significantly predicted effects on cross track 
error. 
Additional analysis was conducted for each of the dependent variables 
considering the AOA status in more detail.  AOA status was divided into four categories, 
unmodified aircraft, aircraft with the SafeFlight system installed, aircraft with the Garmin  
system installed, and aircraft with the BendixKing system installed.  A dummy code 
system was established to represent each of these variables in terms of zeros and ones. 
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Table 9. Regression Results for Cross Track Error. 
  B β t part r 
    
  
AOA modified -.5220 -.0112 -.3523 .0001 
    
  
Vertical Guidance -5.8176 -.0441 -1.5763 .0015 
    
  
Day or Night -3.6769 -.0523 -2.1032* .0027 
    
  
Temperature .0313 .0191 .6002 .0002 
    
  
ATC Present -1.8087 -.0272 -.9719 .0006 
    
  
Runway Length .0008 .0480 1.8864 .0022 
    
  
* significant at the .05 level       
 
The baseline, or control, group, assigned all zeros, was unmodified aircraft.  Three 
variables were created to see how each of the individual AOA systems might have had an 
influence on performance against the control (unmodified aircraft).  Dummy variable A1 
represented the SafeFlight system.  Dummy variable A2 represented the Garmin system, 
and dummy variable A3 represented the Bendix King system.  The dummy coding 
assignments are presented at Table 10.  Results are reported in Tables 11 through 13.  
The significance of each independent variable was tested with degrees of freedom of 1 
and 1615. 
Table 10.  Dummy Coding Assignments. 
  A1 A2 A3   
No modification 0 0 0   
    
  
SafeFlight AOA 1 0 0   
    
  
Garmin AOA 0 1 0   
    
  
BendixKing AOA 0 0 1   
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The regression slopes and beta weights listed in Tables 11 through 13 compare each of 
the AOA systems to the control group of unmodified aircraft.  A one unit change 
represents the difference between the mean of the group specified and the mean of the 
control group. 
Table 11. Regression Results for Speed Differential 
(AOA). 
  B β t part r 
    
  
SafeFlight AOA -.0768 -.0077 -.2920 .0001 
    
  
Garmin AOA -.0660 -.0055 -.2120 .0000 
    
  
BendixKing AOA .0377 .0041 .1568 .0000 
          
    
  
* significant at the .05 level       
 
The regression model for speed differential was not significant, R2 = .00, R2adj = 
.00, F(3,1615) = .06, p = .98.  None of the independent variables significantly contributed 
to the regression model. None of the variables significantly predicted speed differential. 
Table 12. Regression Results for Height Differential 
(AOA). 
  B β t part r 
    
  
SafeFlight AOA 3.1469 .0493 1.8765 .0022 
    
  
Garmin AOA .1384 .0018 .0697 .0000 
    
  
BendixKing AOA 3.3520 .0577 2.1854* .0029 
          
    
  
* significant at the .05 level       
 
The best and only significant predictor of height differential was the BendixKing 
system with a very small correlation coefficient of .045.  The regression model for height 
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differential was not significant, R2 = .00, R2adj = .00, F(3,1615) = 2.32, p = .07, even 
though the BendixKing system was statistically significant by itself.  Given the very 
small correlation of the BendixKing system with height differential and the lack of 
significance of the overall regression model, none of the variables appeared to have 
predicted height differential.  
Table 13. Regression Results for Cross Track Error 
(AOA). 
  B β t part r 
    
  
SafeFlight AOA .4327 .0070 .2668 .0000 
    
  
Garmin AOA -.1591 -.0022 -.0829 .0000 
    
  
BendixKing AOA -.0367 -.0007 -.0248 .0000 
          
    
  
* significant at the .05 level       
 
 The regression model for cross track error was not significant, R2 = .00, R2adj = 
.00, F(3,1615) = .03, p = .99.  None of the independent variables significantly contributed 
to the regression model. None of the variables significantly predicted cross track error. 
 To check for effects on overall approach stability, each dependent variable 
representing an element of a stabilized approach was converted to a z-score and then the 
sum of those z-scores was entered into the original regression.  The additional dependent 
variable zsum refers to the sum of the z-scores for speed differential, height differential, 
and cross track error.  Regression results are reported in Table 14. 
The overall regression model for zsum was significant, R2 = .05, R2adj = .05, 
F(6,1615) = 13.58, p = .00.  Vertical guidance and ATC present significantly contributed 
to the regression model.  Both vertical guidance and ATC present resulted in smaller  
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Table 14. Regression Results for zsum. 
  B β t part r 
    
  
AOA modified -.0536 -.0145 -.4643 .0001 
    
  
Vertical Guidance -1.4941 -.1423 -5.1941* .0160 
    
  
Day or Night .2110 .0377 1.5484 .0014 
    
  
Temperature .0070 .0535 1.7208 .0018 
    
  
ATC Present -.5840 -.1103 -4.0265* .0096 
    
  
Runway Length .0001 .0488 1.9571 .0022 
    
  
* significant at the .05 level       
 
deviations from the optimum approach, so contributed positively to stabilized 
approaches. 
Safety Survey 
 An online survey of students and instructors flying University of North Dakota 
Cessna 172 aircraft was conducted from February 23 through March 10, 2015.  Survey 
web pages are included in Appendix B.  Surveys were submitted by 98 participants. 
 Of 97 participants responding to the question “Which of the following is the 
highest level FAA pilot certificate you hold?” 14 (14.43%) were student pilots, 36 
(37.11%) were private pilots, seven (7.22%) were commercial pilots, and 40 (41.24%) 
held flight instructor certificates (Figure 30).  When questioned about all the various 





Figure 30.  Safety Survey Respondents by Highest Level Pilot Certificate 
responded.  Over one quarter of the pilots responding reported having received no 
training regarding AOA instrumentation on their aircraft (26 or 26.8%).  Of the 
remaining 71 responding pilots (73.2%), 51 (52.58%) reported learning about AOA 
instrumentation from self-study or discussion with other pilots, 24 (24.74%) had received 
ground training about AOA instrumentation from a flight instructor, and 18 (18.56%) had 
received flight training with AOA instrumentation from a flight instructor (Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31. All Types of Training Received on AOA Instrumentation 
 Respondents were informed that three University of North Dakota Cessna 172s 
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they had flown any of these aircraft.  Of 98 pilots responding, 59 (60.2%) said they had 
flown modified aircraft, 30 (30.61%) had not, and nine (9.18%) did not remember or did 
not know if they had flown modified aircraft (Figure 32). 
 
 
Figure 32.  Responding pilots having flown AOA modified aircraft 
 When asked to describe their experience flying AOA modified aircraft, 98 pilots 
responded.  Forty (40.82%) reported having not flown or did not remember flying a 
modified aircraft.  Interestingly, this is one more than reported not flying or not 
remembering flying modified aircraft in the preceding question.  Of the remaining 58 
pilots, 41 (41.84%) reported flying a modified aircraft, but claimed to have ignored the 
AOA instrumentation; 11 (11.22%) reported flying a modified aircraft and using the 
AOA instrumentation for supplemental information during approach and landing; 6 
(6.12%) reported flying a modified aircraft and using the AOA instrumentation 
throughout the flight; none claimed to have flown modified aircraft many times and used 










Figure 33. Experience flying AOA modified aircraft 
 Based on their training and experience, pilots were asked to choose applicable 
statements indicating or comment about practical uses of AOA instrumentation.  Of 88 
responding, 47 (53.41%) chose “avoiding departure stalls,” 41 (46.59%) chose “avoiding 
stalls in the traffic pattern,” 29 (32.96%) chose “avoiding stalls while maneuvering 
inflight,” 12 (13.64%) chose “determining best range or best endurance conditions 
inflight,” and 20 (22.73%) don’t believe there are any practical uses of AOA 
instrumentation on light aircraft (Figure 34).  Additional comments were received from 
14 (15.91%) of respondents.  Two themes were evident in these comments.  First, lack of 
training caused some pilots to choose not to use installed AOA instrumentation or not to 
comment about practical uses of a system with which they were not familiar.  “Due to the 
lack of information about how to use them, I do not know how, so I don't use them,” and 
“I'm not educated on it enough to make an informed decision.”  The second theme was an 
expressed concern about over-reliance on instrumentation at the expense of the implied 
higher importance of learning to fly by feel.  “Pilots should learn to fly by feel in this 
stage of training,” or “It is too early for this ‘cheap’ technology. Manufacturers are 
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calculating AOA differently.”  Other comments referred to seeing AOA vs. airspeed 
relationships and suggested different instrument displays from those installed.  At the 
opposite end of the learn to fly by feel argument was this statement: “Inexperienced pilots 
could benefit from these instruments in avoiding stall conditions, however, I do not 
believe they add much for an experienced pilot who flies regularly.” 
 
 
Figure 34. Practical Uses of AOA Instrumentation 
 Respondents were asked if, in their opinion, general aviation pilots were more 
likely to fly a stabilized turn from base leg to final and a stabilized final approach in 
aircraft equipped with supplemental AOA instrumentation than in aircraft not so 
equipped.  Of the 97 responses received, 33 (34.02%) said yes, 41 (42.27%) said no, and 
23 (23.71%) had no opinion or preferred not to answer (Figure 35). 
 
 
Figure 35. Respondents believing supplemental AOA systems contribute to more 
stabilized final turns and final approaches  
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 When asked if general aviation pilots encountering an unstable approach were 
more likely to execute a go-around in aircraft equipped with supplemental AOA 
instrumentation than those without, 30 (30.93%) of the 97 pilots who responded said yes.  
Just over half (49 or 50.52%) said no, and 18 (18.56%) had no opinion or preferred not to 
answer (Figure 36). 
 
 
Figure 36. Respondents believing pilots encountering unstable approaches were more 
likely to execute a go-around when equipped with supplemental AOA instrumentation 
 
When asked about the most positive aspects of having supplemental AOA 
systems installed on general aviation aircraft, 60 pilots responded.  The dominant theme 
in these comments was increased situational awareness with regard to proximity to the 
stall angle of attack.  One flight instructor said, “It’s another tool to enhance situational 
awareness for a pilot.  It’s one more way for a pilot to help fly a stabilized approach.”  A 
commercial pilot called AOA systems a “good back up for having to look down at 
airspeed, increases situational awareness.”  A private pilot who had received ground and 
flight instruction with the instruments called AOA systems “an accurate look into the 
aircraft performance, as opposed to using hearing and buffeting to determine how close 
the aircraft is to a stall.”  Lack of training in supplemental AOA systems was highlighted 






amount of stall/spin accidents that occur inadvertently in general aviation.  However, for 
this to occur the pilot needs to have proper training on the AOA system.”   
 Responses regarding the most negative aspects of having supplemental AOA 
systems installed on general aviation aircraft numbered 63.  The overwhelming majority 
of comments addressed pilot distraction or potential over-reliance on instrumentation.  
Lack of training was mentioned in many cases and was evident from a misunderstanding 
of the systems displayed in some comments.  One flight instructor said, “I find them to be 
a distraction.  It’s one more thing inside the plane that pilots have to keep them from 
looking outside.  When I flew with the AOA indicators I found myself several times just 
looking at it instead of outside at my aim point.”  One student who reported receiving 
ground and flight instruction from an instructor explained, “I feel like it’s really not 
needed because people do without it all the time, it’s just another thing to look at and 
check to make sure it is not in a high angle of attack.  The point of the flight instruments 
is to look at them and fly according to them, there is no need for another instrument.”  
Another flight instructor noted, “Turning base to final is not the time to be spending too 
much time with your head in the cockpit. Also no good if pilots are not trained on the 
proper use of the system.”  An instructor who has not flown with AOA-modified aircraft 
said, “…adding yet another thing for beginning pilots to keep track of for their training.  
Because UND uses primarily G1000 equipped aircraft, it’s already difficult to keep some 
students focused outside the aircraft, which is essential for training…”  A student pilot 
whose training was limited to self-study or discussion with other pilots was concerned 
AOA instrumentation “could take some of the pilot’s attention away from actually flying 
the aircraft or looking outside during critical phases of flight,” but added, “If they are 
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trained on how to use it though I believe it would be a positive addition to the aircraft.”  
Finally, a commercial pilot with no training on AOA instrumentation said, “I’ve heard 
they are not helpful and too delayed to make any decisions off them.  I don’t know if this 
is true.” 
 The safety survey’s final question asked for specific recommendations to improve 
training regarding supplemental AOA systems on general aviation aircraft and received 
57 responses.  Like the previous questions, respondents were quite divided in their 
opinions with answers covering the spectrum from “Get rid of them!” to “Equip the entire 
fleet!”  Most answers, however, addressed the lack of formal training on supplemental 
AOA systems provided in the school environment up to now.  One private pilot summed 
up the need for training. 
 Start teaching about them in ground schools.  I’ve flown all three and at no point 
 has anyone told me how to use it.  I personally think it’s just one more gadget  
 UND can put in their aircraft and it’s unnecessary.  CFI, CFII, and MEIs should 
 stress the importance of stalls in the traffic pattern, and this includes where it’s  
 most likely to occur, also the correct place.  They should also be stressing turn 
 coordination more.  I’ve flown on observation flights where the student didn’t 
 make a single coordinated turn and nothing was said or corrected by the  
 instructor.  Safety deferred is safety denied, plain and simple. 
 
Another private pilot added, “teaching about it in ground school, and explaining how it 
works and why it can beneficial, students and instructors would utilize it much more 
often and it could be a great and efficient tool to increase situational awareness.”  
Frustration was not limited to non-instructors.  One CFI explained,  
 I have never received training on the AOA indicator.  I have read some manuals, 
 but don’t really know when to use it.  Since we are doing training, we often have 
 high AOA intentionally, so I just ignore the AOA indicator.  If I receive proper  
 training on how to use it, my opinion might change but for now I just don’t know 




Another CFI provided system-specific critiques and recommendations, while also 
concluding with a misunderstanding of the differences between airspeed and angle of 
attack and their relationship to stall. 
 Of the three that we have I feel as if two of them are fairly useless and one is  
 excellent.  The high-mid-low ones are not useful in my opinion but the one 
 that shows varying segments as you approach critical angle of attack is actually 
 really good.  When we practice stalls in the airplane, during slow flight, that one  
 just had a series of slow paced quiet beeps, and as we got to a buffet the AOA 
 sensor was beeping louder and more rapidly as well as indicating a red downward  
 arrow.  I feel as if that could be a benefit to someone who is less experienced and 
 might influence them to reduce AOA more urgently than a traditional stall horn. 
 That to me is what a good angle of attack indicator should do as an enhancement 
 to a stall horn.  The other thing useful that it does is that on landing if a student or  
 pilot were to flare high and airspeed is reduced significantly, they might be  
 unaware of how close they are to stall, but the rapid beeping and downward  
 pointed arrow just a degree or two away from critical AOA might influence a  
 go-around, a positive outcome.  Personally I have seen a student flare high in that 
 airplane and with the AOA indicator beeping at its most urgent state, sure enough 
 we dropped right onto the runway and it was a poor landing.  I do not believe we 











 Over the course of 1,616 analyzed approaches flown between October 1, 2013 
and December 31, 2014, the addition of supplemental angle of attack systems alone did 
not significantly increase the likelihood of University of North Dakota pilots flying a 
stabilized approach.  The overall regression models for speed and height differential were 
significant, and although these are the two aspects of stabilized approaches where an 
effect due to AOA system installation would be most expected, no significant effect was 
observed.  Likewise, checking each individual AOA system for influence on approach 
performance against the control group of unmodified aircraft yielded no significant 
regression models.  In the case of height differential, the BendixKing KLR 10 AOA 
system by itself contributed significantly to the model with a very small correlation 
coefficient, but the overall regression model was not significant.  As a result, none of the 
individual systems was considered to have predicted speed differential, height 
differential, or cross track error. 
With regard to the presence of vertical guidance from an approach lighting system 
or radio signal from an instrument landing system, no significant effect was observed on 
speed differential or cross track error.  However, perhaps as expected due to the increased 
amount of glide path information available to the pilot, presence of a vertical guidance 
system significantly lowered height differential, contributing to a more stable approach. 
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 Day approaches significantly increased speed differential.  Further research might 
be warranted in this area, but possible reasons for this relationship might include 
increased visual cues available in the daytime competing with instrument crosscheck and 
more attention paid to instruments for orientation at night.  Daytime also generally results 
in more air traffic, so an increased speed differential might also be associated with speed 
adjustments accommodating that traffic.  Time of day had no significant effect on height 
differential.  While day approaches significantly reduced cross track error in the 
regression model, the overall model was not significant. 
Outside air temperature did not significantly affect speed differential or cross 
track error.  Interestingly, a higher outside air temperature was associated with a higher 
height differential.  Summer conditions sometimes result in higher levels of convective 
turbulence than experienced during the winter, which might have an adverse effect on the 
pilot’s ability to maintain a stable glide path.  More research is warranted regarding 
seasonal effects on stabilized approaches. 
Presence of an operating air traffic control tower  resulted in significantly lower 
speed differential and height differential.  ATC presence had no significant effect on 
cross track error.  Possible reasons for these effects include busier and more regimented 
traffic patterns associated with tower controlled airports requiring pilots to focus more 
heavily on precise speed and glide path control to remain de-conflicted with other 
airplanes. 
Runway characteristics of length and width are highly positively correlated for 
what might seem to be obvious reasons.  Runways built for larger aircraft requiring 
longer takeoff or landing rolls also require wider surfaces to safely handle an increased 
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aircraft footprint.  Increased runway length significantly resulted in higher speed 
differential but lower height differential.  Runway length had no significant effect on 
cross track error.  Both significant effects might be associated with small aircraft 
operations on larger runways.  Smaller aircraft might tend to land longer on larger 
runways since landing distance is not as critical.  Similarly, most instrument approaches 
are made to longer runways.  Small aircraft tend to fly higher than final approach 
airspeeds during the instrument approach and slow to normal speeds when approaching 
the touchdown zone of the runway.  Instrument approaches are also designed for a 
touchdown point farther from the approach end than might be used for a visual approach 
to a short runway.  Pilots flying visual approaches or simulating short field approaches on 
long runways might aim short of the desired touchdown point, resulting in a lower height 
differential. 
 Given many years of favorable performance on military aircraft and the FAA’s 
emphasis on making supplemental AOA systems more available to general aviation 
aircraft, an expectation was established that a positive relationship between installed 
AOA systems and improved elements of a stabilized approach would exist.  A number of 
data collection limitations and a current lack of formalized training in AOA 
instrumentation may have contributed to finding no significant effects. 
Historically, light general aviation aircraft have not been designed or equipped to 
collect flight data.  As a result, few of these aircraft have any capability to record relevant 
flight parameters useful for safety research.  Recently, some aircraft owners and flying 
schools have begun to install recording equipment on their airplanes to provide data 
useful for conducting safety analysis or providing playback of flight training.  The 
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University of North Dakota’s flight data monitoring system used in this study is able to 
capture many flight parameters from the Garmin G1000 avionics, but despite being much 
more capable than the majority of general aviation aircraft in this area, several real 
limitations still exist with regard to analyzing a dynamic approach environment.   
Recording equipment is limited to a 1Hz update rate, meaning that the raw data is 
limited to “snapshots” of flight parameters once per second.  While university staff have 
developed analysis tools for converting snapshot data to “pictures” of dynamic 
approaches, these pictures are still limited by data only being input to the model once 
each second.  Also, the recording equipment is unable to measure some key parameters 
associated with landing approaches.  Aircraft are not equipped with a radar altimeter, so 
altitude above the terrain must be calculated based on a combination of GPS position, the 
assumption of a correct altimeter setting, and computation of pressure altitude.  Even 
with a correctly set pressure altimeter, allowable instrument error is +/- 75 feet. 
The aircraft in question have fixed landing gear, so no weight on wheels sensors 
are available to tell the flight recorder when the airplane is on the ground.  Likewise, flap 
position is not recorded, so even an educated guess about what the airplane is doing on or 
close to the ground is made more difficult. 
Another data measurement limitation springs from the fact that all three of the 
installed AOA systems are hard-wired to the aircraft’s electrical power system.  
Theoretically, if power is applied to the airplane, the instrument is operating.  There is no 
way to tell from recordings if installed indicators were operating, were calibrated 
correctly, or had been muted or turned off by the pilots.  Since all data was collected in a 
naturalistic environment where neither pilots nor maintenance personnel knew the AOA 
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instrumentation was being observed, there may be an unknown number of cases where 
the instrument was not powered or calibrated for proper use inflight. 
Since the sample size for this study was quite large, the lack of significant effects 
due to AOA systems was not likely due to power limitations.  Also, the pilot population 
was quite homogeneous in terms of approximate age (all participants in a university flight 
training program) and the flying environment in which they operate.  At the same time, 
demographic information was necessarily limited due to privacy concerns and the true 
nature of pilot experience may not be evident.  Training experience, social interaction, 
and resulting feelings about the addition of supplemental AOA instrumentation might 
tend to be more homogeneous with this sample than with the overall general aviation 
population. 
Collecting data in a naturalistic environment where the pilots were unaware they 
were being observed is useful to limit the Hawthorne effect (tendency of individuals to 
adjust their behavior based on their awareness of being observed), but it also limits the 
researcher’s ability to collect detailed debrief information which could have provided 
more details about the approaches flown and analyzed.  For example, post-flight 
questionnaires or interviews might have yielded more information about instrument 
operation, details of maneuvers flown, and pilot inputs regarding specific use or non-use 
of AOA instrumentation on that specific flight. 
Perhaps the largest limitation on this study was a distinct lack of formal training 
on angle of attack concepts and AOA instrumentation among the pilot sample surveyed.  
Pilots surveyed responded less than 90 days from the end of the flight data collection 
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period, so the assumption is made that many respondents to the safety survey were also 
pilots who flew during the flight data collection phase.   
 Of the 98 pilot participants in the safety survey, none responded that he or she had 
“extensive experience” flying with AOA instrumentation, yet many expressed strong 
opinions both pro and con.  Over 82 percent of survey respondents reported either not 
having flown an AOA-modified aircraft or having ignored the instrument when they flew 
a modified aircraft.  Only 17 pilots responding reported using the AOA instrumentation 
for supplemental information during approach and landing or throughout their flights.  If 
what the pilots say about how they flew closely resembles how they actually did fly, this 
may be a major explanation for the lack of effect observed for AOA-modified aircraft on 
stabilized approaches.  The instrumentation has gone largely unused. 
 This situation was reported to be largely due to a lack of formal training.  When 
the three different AOA systems were installed in university aircraft, a conscious decision 
was made to install the instruments before formal training was offered.  The reasoning 
reported was that these instruments were so intuitive that formal training would not be 
required.  What was perhaps not anticipated was that pilots, particularly low time pilots, 
are often taught to develop habit patterns to keep them safe.  Comments received in the 
safety survey often presented the theme of “I didn’t need it yesterday.  Why do I need it 
today?”  Others adopted an attitude often taught in other safety programs of not operating 
a system for which they had not received training.   
The level of training in AOA instrumentation was self-reported in the safety 
survey.  Over one quarter of the respondents (26.8 percent) reported having received no 
training at all regarding AOA instrumentation on their aircraft.  Just over half (52.6 
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percent) reported learning what they knew about AOA instrumentation from “self-study 
or discussion with other pilots,” and the remaining quarter reported receiving some kind 
of ground and/or flight instruction on the systems from a flight instructor.  “Self-study or 
discussion with other pilots” allows for a wide spectrum of interpretation, but pilots 
operating in a homogeneous training environment likely tend to discuss the topic with 
their classmates, and may tend toward similar opinions, whether or not they are based on 
technically correct information.  In this study, those not in favor of using supplemental 
AOA systems on general aviation aircraft number approximately half the respondents and 
those in favor of using them or not wanting to express an opinion constitute the other 
half, yet three out of four had not received training beyond what they reported as self-
study or discussion. 
The low level of training, and resultant ignoring of the instrumentation, might be 
masking useful information about installed AOA systems which might not become 
evident until a trained pilot population is sampled.  For example, at least one survey 
respondent had a definite opinion about which AOA system works best, but any potential 
effect it may have had on performance was lost among the high number of approaches 
flown where AOA equipment was ignored. 
Investigating whether general aviation pilots who fly AOA-equipped aircraft are 
more likely to execute a go-around if they encounter an unstable approach than those 
flying aircraft not so equipped became nearly impossible due to a combination of data 
measurement technical limitations and lack of training among the survey respondents.  
The previously mentioned 1Hz update rate, lack of a radar altimeter, no weight-on-
wheels sensor, and lack of information about flap position effectively mask detection of 
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low altitude go-arounds.  Review of available data indicated a lack of reliability in 
differentiating late go-arounds from touch and go or full stop landings.  Of 1,616 
approaches analyzed, 310 or 19.2 percent, were labeled unstable by study criteria.  By 
training policy, these approaches should have resulted in a go-around, but the actual 
number executed was not identifiable by the flight data. 
Even in cases where a go-around appears to have occurred at a higher altitude (as 
illustrated by the 28 outlier cases eliminated from the approach analysis), no reliable 
method exists to differentiate among an intentional low approach, an ATC-directed go-
around, or a go-around due to an unstable approach. 
Survey responses do no better at predicting go-arounds due to unstable 
approaches.  Respondents expressed their belief that pilots encountering unstable 
approaches were more likely to execute a go-around when equipped with supplemental 
AOA instrumentation at about the same rates they thought the systems were useful in 
general.  With 97 pilots responding, 30.9 percent believe pilots would be more likely to 
execute a go-around from an unstable approach if equipped with AOA instrumentation.  
Just over half (50.5 percent) believed they would not, and the remaining 18.6 percent 
offered no opinion. 
Only 57 pilots responded to questions about specific recommendations to improve 
training regarding supplemental AOA systems, and like the other responses to the safety 
survey, represented a wide variety of opinions.  Even in responses not specifically 
recommending topics for training, misconceptions regarding airspeed versus AOA 
relationships were voiced, and indicated the need for better training in aerodynamic 
concepts.  Many respondents agreed that AOA concepts and systems should be taught in 
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ground school in the same way other aircraft systems are taught.  From there, flight 
training incorporating the concepts taught in ground school could be practiced.  Some 
instructors expressed frustration with not knowing exactly how and when to use the 
instrumentation based on reading basic manuals provided by the manufacturers, and 
wanted more detailed information from knowledgeable sources. 
Ultimately this study was about incorporating supplemental instrument displays 
into effective pilot decision making, but to accurately assess effect, the pilots must be 
trained to use the equipment and task being studied.  To observe real differences between 
AOA-aided approaches and non-AOA approaches, future studies should examine groups 
of pilots who have and have not received formal training in AOA system use.  While the 
Hawthorne effect may have a greater risk of being present, study participants should be 
volunteers willing to have their performance measured as well as willing to participate in 
more detailed debriefings of their flights.  Supplemental AOA systems are worthy of 
more future study once adequate formal training has been provided, but until then, their 
demonstrated effectiveness must be considered inconclusive. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 Future research regarding supplemental AOA systems on light general aviation 
aircraft should focus on overcoming the three most restrictive limitations observed during 
this study: inclusion of formal training for subject pilots, developing a reliable ability to 
analyze approaches resulting in a go-around, and collection of pilot feedback 
immediately following flights using supplemental AOA systems.  Research strengthened 
in each of these areas will provide more information needed to determine if supplemental 
AOA systems can truly potentially prevent loss of control accidents. 
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 Formal training should be conducted in both ground and flight training settings 
prior to conducting future performance testing.  This training should include aerodynamic 
theory related to angle of attack as well as how the specific instrument of interest 
operates.  Subjects to fly data collection flights should be identified to participate as 
either trained pilots using supplemental AOA systems or non-trained pilots flying without 
AOA instrumentation.  Pilots receiving training should also have the opportunity to train 
in flight with the AOA instrumentation before flying approaches for record.  
Comparisons can then be made between AOA-equipped flights and non-AOA-equipped 
flights. 
 Future research must address the issue of reliably identifying go-arounds at the 
conclusion of subject approaches.  Several methods are available to address this problem.  
First, researchers can develop an additional analysis tool which could model various 
landing and go-around situations from the flight parameters collected.  Second, with 
sufficient support made available, improved flight recording equipment could be used to 
more accurately represent the dynamic environment experienced during the approaches 
flown.  Finally, should resources not be available to procure needed technological 
improvements, pilot observations could be manually recorded to overcome much of the 
uncertainty experienced in the naturalistic setting of this study.  Observer pilots could be 
equipped with an event log to be carried on each subject flight, where relevant 
information regarding AOA system use and each approach could be recorded in writing. 
 Post-flight questionnaires and interviews should be used to determine types of 
approaches flown, flap settings, how the approach terminated, pilots’ comments about 
relevant events, and other feedback needed by the researcher.  This type of qualitative 
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data collection focuses on detailed event feedback based on training and actual 
performance rather than comment by random participants.  Data collected in this manner 
might overcome some of the potential biases observed during this study which might 
have developed in members of a homogeneous pilot group before receiving formal 
training. 
 Including these improvements in future research procedures establishes more of 
an operational test environment than the naturalistic setting of the present study.  While 
potential for the Hawthorne effect must be considered in this scenario, far greater 
potential to collect useful data more reliably identifying performance effects due to 






















List of Terms 
 
AGL - feet above ground level 
Angle of attack – the angle measured in degrees between the wing’s chord line and the  
relative wind or freestream velocity vector 
Base – a short descending flight path at right angles to the approach end extended  
centerline of the landing runway 
Chord line - a line drawn between the wing’s leading edge and its trailing edge 
Critical Angle of Attack - that angle of attack at which the wing’s maximum lift is  
achieved, beyond which there is a significant loss of lift and increase in drag,  
where the wing “stalls” 
Drag – the force that acts parallel to the relative wind 
Electronic Flight Information System (EFIS) – an airplane instrument display system 
 in which the display is electronic rather than electromechanical 
Final – the last leg in an aircraft’s approach to the landing runway, where the aircraft is  
 aligned with the runway and descending for landing 
G loading (also load factor) – the dimensionless ratio of an aircraft’s lift to its weight 
 expressed in terms of the apparent acceleration of gravity experienced by an 
 observer on board the aircraft 
Go-around (also rejected landing) -- abandoning a landing attempt from 
 final approach 
ILS – Instrument Landing System – a ground based instrument approach system 
 designed to provide precision lateral and vertical guidance to an appropriately 
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 equipped aircraft using a combination of radio signals, to allow a precision 
 approach during instrument conditions.  The lateral guidance is provided by 
 a localizer signal, and the vertical guidance is provided by a glide slope signal. 
KIAS - Knots Indicated Airspeed 
Light-emitting Diode (LED) – a semiconductor which emits light when electrical current 
 passes through it 
Lift – the force acting perpendicular to the relative wind 
NACA 2412 airfoil – airfoil shape categorized by the National Advisory Committee for 
 Aeronautics commonly used in light general aviation airplane design 
PAPI – Precision Approach Path Indicator – a lighting system serving as a visual aid 
to pilots acquiring and maintaining a proper glide path to the landing runway. 
It is installed on either side of the runway approximately 1,000 feet from 
the approach end and displays combinations of red and white lights to indicate an 
 airplane’s height in relation to the desired glide path. 
 




Pitot/static system – a system of pressure-sensitive instruments designed to determine  
 airspeed, altitude, and altitude trend 
Relative wind - the direction at which a vehicle in flight meets the oncoming airstream 
Secure Digital (SD) card – small flash memory card used to store large amounts of data 
 on a small device 
Sideslip angle – rotation of the aircraft centerline from the relative wind, generally  
 referred to as positive when the relative wind approaches from right of the  
 nose and negative when the relative wind approaches from left of the nose 
Stall – a condition where the wing drastically loses lift at an angle of attack greater than 
 the critical angle of attack 
Spin – a stall resulting in autorotation about the vertical axis and descending in a shallow, 
 rotating path 
Stall warning tab – a component of some light aircraft stall warning systems where a thin,  
 moveable, metal tab is mounted in an opening in the leading edge of a wing.  The  
 tab is moved by air from the relative wind striking it.  As airflow approaches the 
 critical angle of attack, the tab strikes a plate which activates a stall warning horn 
 audible to the pilot.  
VASI – Vertical Approach Slope Indicator – a lighting system serving as a visual aid 
 to pilots acquiring and maintaining a proper glide path to the landing runway. 
 Light bars are installed at different distances from the approach end on the side of 
the landing runway, so red or white lights are displayed depending on the  
airplane’s glide path angle.  If on the desired glide path, the far bar will display 
red while the near bar displays white.  This is commonly referred to as “red over 
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white.”  VASI has been replaced by the newer PAPI at many airports. 
 
























Airports and Runways Used for Approach Analysis 
 
Grand Forks International Airport, Grand Forks, ND 
 




Hutson Field, Grafton, ND 
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